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There has been a pervasive failure by investment tribunals to grasp the singularly 
compensatory nature of moral damages awarded to investors. The failure to distinguish 
moral damages from other forms of reparation such as satisfaction and restitution -- never 
mind punitive damages -- has led to various doctrinal and practical difficulties in the 
treatment of moral damages.1 
 
Moral damages have enjoyed a long history in public international law. In that tradition, 
the venerable Lusitania decision defined moral damages as compensation “for an injury 
inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, humiliation, shame, 
degradation, loss of social position or injury to his credit or to his reputation,”2 thereby 
identifying those injuries remedied by moral damages as mental or reputational injuries. 
Significantly, that decision emphasized that moral damages “are very real”3 despite their 
intangible nature, which “affords no reason why the injured person should not be 
compensated therefor as compensatory damages, but not as a penalty.”4 This is still 
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eminently good law, as the International Law Commission has made clear in its Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The Draft Articles 
clarify that states must make full reparation for injury caused, “whether material or 
moral,” which are “financially assessable and may be the subject of a claim for 
compensation” rather than satisfaction or restitution, or a fortiori punitive damages.5 
 
Despite this guidance, investment law has been slow to comprehend moral damages, and 
then in less than coherent fashion. It was not until 2011 in the ICSID case of Lemire v. 
Ukraine that an investment tribunal articulated the requirements of moral damages, 
concluding that moral damages are appropriate only if the host state’s actions involve 
physical duress, result in mental suffering or loss of reputation, and whose cause and 
effect are grave.6 However, while Lemire clarified the elements of moral damages, 
various doctrinal and practical difficulties persist. For instance, many cases neglect to 
identify the specific categories of moral damages (mental or reputational injuries), 
thereby contributing to their uncertainty. Take Benvenuti v. Congo, which involved an 
Italian investor whose personnel fled Congo after being warned of their imminent arrest. 
Although unpersuaded that the claimant had suffered moral damages from losing its 
personnel or credit, the Benvenuti tribunal nonetheless awarded moral damages for 
“disturb[ances]” caused by the expropriation, but without elaborating on what injuries 
such “disturbances” inflicted.7 Separately, a risk of double-counting is present when 
categories of moral damages are ill-defined; for example, damages awarded for 
expropriation that are based on fair market value may already factor in loss of reputation. 
Conversely, neglecting to identify the precise category may lead to a failure to recognize 
existing moral damages. For example, the majority decision in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania 
found moral damages “inappropriate” after determining that no injury was suffered as the 
investment had already failed at the time of its expropriation.8 However, this finding 
conflates economic injury to the investment with moral (i.e., mental or reputational) 
injury sustained by the investor. 
 
A related difficulty concerns the haphazard quantification of moral damages. Various 
tribunals have suggested that such calculation is “equitable,”9 satisfied by awarding on 
the investor’s principal claims,10 or measured “in proportion” to the investment’s value.11 
However, these approaches are inconsistent with compensation offsetting the particular 
damages suffered.12 The task instead must be to affix a sum representing the loss 
suffered, which in turn requires specific identification of the moral injuries caused. 
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Another difficulty relates to the suggestion that moral damages are premised on “fault-
based liability,”13 which in turn implies that they are punitive. Yet, neither Lusitania nor 
the Draft Articles require “fault” as an element of moral damages, but rather regard such 
damages as purely compensatory. 
 
In sum, many difficulties relating to moral damages can be ameliorated by identifying the 
distinct categories of moral damages suffered, and treating them categorically as 
compensation rather than as satisfaction, restitution or punitive damages. 
 
The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the following acknowledgment: 
“Jarrod Wong, ‘The compensatory nature of moral damages in investor-state arbitration,’ Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 88, February 4, 2013. Reprinted with permission from the Vale Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment (www.vcc.columbia.edu).” A copy should kindly be sent to the Vale 
Columbia Center at vcc@law.columbia.edu. 
 
For further information, including information regarding submitting to the Perspectives, please contact: 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Jennifer Reimer, jreimer01@gmail.com or 
jreimer@lyhplaw.com. 
 
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), led by Lisa Sachs, is a joint 
center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University. It is the only applied 
research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice and discussion of sustainable international 
investment, through interdisciplinary research, advisory projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue, educational 
programs, and the development of resources and tools. 
 
Most recent Columbia FDI Perspectives 
 
• No. 87, Ralph Alexander Lorz, “Trying to change the rules for responding to arbitration 
unilaterally: The proposed new framework for investor-state dispute settlement for the EU,” 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, January 22, 2013. 
• No. 86, Catharine Titi, “EU investment agreements and the search for a new balance: A paradigm 
shift from laissez-faire liberalism toward embedded liberalism?,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, 
January 3, 2013. 
• No. 85, Karl P. Sauvant and Huiping Chen, “A China – US bilateral investment treaty: A 
template for a multilateral framework for investment?,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, December 
17, 2012. 
• No. 84, Saurav Pathak et al., “Inward foreign direct investment: Does it enable or constrain 
domestic technology entrepreneurship?,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, December 3, 2012. 
• No. 83, Xiaofang Shen, “Untying the land knot: Turning investment challenges into opportunities 
for all citizens,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, November 19, 2012. 
• No. 82, John Kline, “Evaluate Sustainable FDI to Promote Sustainable Development,” Columbia 
FDI Perspectives, November 5, 2012. 
• No. 81, Ilan Alon and Aleh Cherp, “Is China’s outward investment in oil a global security 
concern?,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, October 22, 2012. 
• No. 80, Jo En Low, “State-controlled entities as ‘investors’ under international investment 
agreements,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, October 8, 2012. 
• No. 79, Lise Johnson, “Absent from the discussion: The other half of investment promotion,” 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, September 24, 2012. 
 
All previous FDI Perspectives are available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/fdi-
perspectives. 
                                                 
13
 Desert Line, op. cit., at para. 290. 
